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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1

The Factual Summary of Plaintiff/Respondent (hereinafter "Pla" or "Ballard") omits and
does not dispute the key uncontroverted facts as set forth in Appellants' Opening Brief, (hereinafter
"App. Br.") at p. 2-6. Ballard makes several contested statements for which there is not adequate
page length to discuss. For example, on p. 6 Ballard contends Krystal's health condition rapidly
declined after her surgery on July 21. This is not accurate and is directly refuted by the medical
records See Ex. 5, 7 and 8. It was not until the early morning of July 25, that the patient had any
symptoms or complaints other than pain. Id. Ballard states on p. 7 he proved bacteria was injected
into the patient by Dr. Kerr, however, the citations he identifies do not support that conclusion. On
p. 6-7, Ballard suggests the autopsy performed by Dr. Groben contained a quote favorable to him
when the quote provided actually refers to testimony by his retained expert, Dr. Nichols, offering
his contested interpretation of the autopsy findings. Tr. 559, L.1-10. The actual autopsy findings
were favorable to Appellants regarding the appearance of the surgical wounds as Dr. Groben stated
he found "no gross evidence of an infectious process" Ex. 9, p. 5.
II.

ARGUMENT

A.

Absent proof of deliberate misconduct, the award of costs and fees by the court
for the mistrial constitutes reversible error, p. 13.

1 Ballard seeks to cast aspersions against Appellants and goes to great lengths to color the record
with references to collateral and irrelevant matters and misleading accusations rather than focusing
on the specific issues on appeal. Ballard viciously accuses Appellants of being scallywags and
scoundrels at every level of the proceeding which reduces the persuasiveness, validity and force of
much of his response. Appellants do not have enough pages to respond to these irrelevant issues
beyond making it clear that the representations are disputed and are of no further relevance to this
appeal.
Appellants' Reply Brief - 1

Throughout his brief, Ballard contends the mistrial was granted because the defense
allegedly violated the court's motion in limine regarding other patient infections. See Res. Br. at p.
1, 8-9, 13-15, 17-20, 69, and 92. In this section, however, Ballard claims the mistrial was granted
for a host of other unrelated reasons. Id. at 8-10, 17-20. This issue is resolved solely by looking at
the transcript reflecting the court order and the witness testimony as set forth in App. Br.
The court's verbal order definitively stated the basis for the mistrial was the defense had
allegedly violated the order in limine. 11/14/13 Tr. 104, L.10-Tr.108, L.16. Fifteen months later the
court issued its written order on costs and fees. R. 2661-2670. The defense opposed this with
affidavits and a detailed analysis incorporated herein at R. 1844-1984. Ballard spends pages
addressing Rule 54( d)(l )(D) relating to awarding costs and fees from both trials. Reference to this
rule is inapplicable since the mistrial is governed solely by Rule 47(u). The district court's reference
to Rule 54(d) in its order related to awarding costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs for
the first trial in addition to attorney fees. No discretionary costs or attorney fees were awarded for
the second trial. R. 2661-2669. The lack of argument as to Rule 54(d) does not mean this issue has
been waived. Instead, the basis for any award of costs or attorney fees is grounded in the application
of Rule 47(u) which was extensively addressed in App. Br. at p. 8-11. 2
Ballard concludes he was unfairly prejudiced and makes the same mistake the court did by

2 Should Appellants prevail that the district court erred by concluding there was any deliberate
misconduct by Appellants, the award of both costs and attorney fees for the first trial should be
vacated. Similarly, should Appellant prevail separately on any issue involving the second trial for
which a new trial would be the remedy, the award of any costs for the second trial would also be
reversed. Ballard's claim Appellant waived this issue per Rule 54(d) is without merit. Res. Br. 17.
Appellants' Reply Brief - 2

trying to after-the-fact justify the erroneous decision to grant the mistrial in the first place. The
focus is shifted away from whether the witness actually said anything in violation of the order to
instead just assuming he did. Ballard skips over the primary point that the trial transcript disputes
the in limine order was ever violated. 3 See 11/14/13 Tr. 104, L.10-Tr.106, L.8; R. 2663.
On November 14, 2013, the defense called Dr. Stiller and alerted the court of the intention
to revisit the lack of other infections issue. 11 /14/13 Tr. 9, L. 15-22. Dr. Stiller was explaining why
gram negative bacteria found at autopsy in the right buttock and nowhere else could not have come
from Dr. Kerr's instruments. While giving his answer, Ballard interrupted and argued the witness
had violated the motion in limine and demanded a mistrial on that issue alone which the court
immediately granted. 11/14/13 Tr. 106, L.9-Tr.107, L.5. At no time did Dr. Stiller state his opinion
was based on their being no other patient infections, nor was such a question posed. Dr. Stiller did
not refer to anyone other than Krystal. 11/14/13 Tr. 105, L.5-Tr.106, L.8. Ballard moved for a
mistrial based on his interpretation as opposed to what was actually said. Id.
The court failed to consider any less severe sanctions that would have prevented the
substantial costs and allegations of prejudice associated with a mistrial. See State v. Grantham, 146
Idaho 490, 498 (Ct App. 2008) ("The admission of improper evidence does not automatically
require the declaration of a mistrial.") 4 Dr. Stiller's testimony was neither devastating to Ballard's

3 Ballard clouds the issue by referencing a separate motion in limine related to insurance and
contained in his stipulated trial exhibits which Ballard elected to redact in the second trial.
4 Case authorities outside of Idaho involving mistrials in the medical malpractice context are also
in accord. See Porter v. Lima Mem'l Hosp., 995 F.2d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 1993) (references to prior
trial did not unfairly prejudice plaintiff since no reference made to the verdict or final outcome of
Appellants' Reply Brief - 3

case, nor a violation of the order in limine. The court's failure to consider a lesser remedy, like an
immediate instruction, is further evidence of its abuse of discretion. Dr. Stiller's testimony did not
preclude a fair trial, as a result the court erred in sanctioning the defense.
Ballard argues the court was free to weigh the affidavit of Dr. Stiller regarding his efforts
to comply with the in limine order in determining whether Appellants engaged in deliberate
misconduct, however there was nothing to weigh it against per the requirements of Rule 47(u). Id.
The court also ignored this issue by concluding the defense assumed the risk of presenting an
inexperienced expert which does not establish deliberate misconduct per Rule 47(u). R. 2663.
The record on appeal contains that portion of the first trial containing the court's verbal
order regarding the motions and orders in limine (See 11/5/13 Tr.), the testimony of Dr. Stiller,
Ballard's objection, motion for mistrial and the entire discussion and ruling by the court granting
the mistrial (11/14/13 Tr.). This represents the entirety of the record on appeal for this issue. 5
Ballard spends pages attacking counsel for Appellants claiming numerous other events
occurred during both trials that support the court order of costs and fees for the mistrial. 6 While

first case); Alexander v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 484 F.3d 889,906 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming
denial of mistrial even though the conduct specifically violated court's order in limine ).
5 Furthermore, the court's order on costs and fees does not cite any specific testimony which would
have suggested the need for any further transcript. See R. 2661-70. If Ballard contends something
else from the first trial has any bearing on this issue, he had every opportunity to augment the record
to include it. See Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 790 (2002) (discussing requirements to
augment record on appeal when a record or exhibit needed is not included in the record.) Ballard
concluded it was Dr. Stiller's testimony alone that deprived him of a fair trial when he moved for a
mistrial which the court granted. See 11/14/13 Tr. 106, L.21-Tr. 107, L.12.
6 It is readily gleaned from the transcript that the district court did not get along with counsel for
Appellants and this conflict wore on throughout both trials. Proof of this is reflected in the transcript
Appellants' Reply Brief - 4

such contentions are irrelevant, disputed by the record and serve simply to try and unfairly paint
the defense counsel in an unflattering light, they had nothing to do with the court's decision to grant
the mistrial as the transcript reflects. Since there was no deliberate misconduct by the defense, there
is no basis to award costs and attorney fees per Rule 47(u) and the court's order must be reversed.
Appellants objected to an award of fees and costs for the mistrial in their Memorandum m
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions, R. 1948, p. 1955-1971.
B.

Ballard did not present substantial and competent evidence establishing a
violation of the standard of care or proximate cause for the death, p. 21.

[W]hen it appears to the reviewing court that the verdict is either: (1) not supported
by substantial competent evidence; or (2) against the clear weight of the evidence;
or, in other words, if upon its review of the evidence in the record the reviewing
court determines that reasonable minds could not differ concerning the issues of
negligence or causation, then those issues become questions of law and not of fact
upon which the court may freely rule ... a verdict cannot be based on conjecture.
When there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict, or when the verdict is
against the great weight of the evidence, the verdict cannot stand.
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 726-27 (1987) (emphasis added).
Where the jury verdict is challenged on appeal this Court is entitled to review the evidence and
determine if the verdict is against the clear weight or unsupported by substantial and competent
evidence. The jury verdict in this case was not so supported and should be reversed.

cited on appeal and in the court's baseless findings in its order on costs. R. 2661-70. Seeking to
take advantage of this, Ballard refers repeatedly to issues and evidence unrelated to any issue on
appeal which illustrates the unfair strategy to try and unfairly influence this Court on irrelevant
matters. For example, on p. 9 (and again on p.20), Ballard accuses counsel of making an irrelevant
remark. This remark was made when the judge and jury were not in the courtroom. It was a
confidential remark overheard by Res. counsel despite the fact it was intended to be made solely
between defense counsel and not meant to be heard by anyone else.
Appellants' Reply Brief - 5

1.

Dr. Sorensen did not have actual knowledge of the local standard of
health care practice applicable to Dr. Kerr, p. 22.

"An expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must show
that he or she is familiar with the standard of care for the particular health care professional for the
relevant community and time." Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 13 7 Idaho 160,
164 (2002). In Ramos v. Dixon this court discussed the obligation of attorneys to take proactive
steps to ensure their expert has the required actual knowledge:
The attorney must be directly involved in advising the expert as to how to learn the
applicable standard of care and in determining whether the expert has done so. It is
not sufficient that the expert believes he or she has done so ... I.C. 6-1012 precludes
assuming that the standard of care is uniform throughout Idaho.
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 37-38 (2007) (emphasis added).
While Ramos involved an out of area expert, the court's discussion is no less relevant where
a plaintiff expert is otherwise not familiar with the standard of care applicable to the defendant.
Ballard merely assumes the prior contact Dr. Sorensen had in the Boise area was sufficient to give
him to have an adequate foundation for his opinion. The defense objected to his foundation being
sufficient which the court overruled. Tr. 342, L.4-15; Tr. 475, L.5-476, L.21. Taking into account
the requirements in LC. 6-1012, the evidence at trial demonstrates Dr. Sorensen did not have the
required actual knowledge of the standards applicable to Dr. Kerr. See App. Br. p. 39-41.
Ballard discusses several aspects of Dr. Sorensen's experiences practicing plastic surgery
in Boise and performing inspections in support of his conclusion that he has actual knowledge
applicable to Dr. Kerr. Dr. Sorensen is trained in plastic surgery, whereas Dr. Kerr is trained in

Appellants' Reply Brief - 6

anesthesia. Tr. 325, L.2-6; Tr. 772, L.19-22; Tr. 836, L.10-14. Dr. Sorensen worked as an inspector
for surgery centers, however, Appellants did not operate a surgery center. Tr. 332, L.20-21. Dr.
Sorensen walked through St. Luke's Hospital in Boise, however, the way they clean equipment at a
certified hospital facility was not shown to be comparable to the standards regarding how reusable
medical equipment is to be cleaned and sterilized in an office based practice like Dr. Kerr's. Tr.
337, L.4-13. Dr. Sorensen took no steps to confirm with anyone of a similar specialty and practice
to Dr. Kerr that he had actual knowledge of the applicable standard. This should have been fatal to
the foundation for Dr. Sorensen's opinions.
Ballard confuses compliance with certification requirements versus compliance with CDC
guidelines. Res. Br. p. 24. It is undisputed Appellants did not have a certified facility, nor were they
required to be certified. Tr. 2075, L.8-2076, L.10. This issue involves Dr. Sorensen's improper
testimony that compliance with CDC guidelines was somehow required which was not true and an
abuse of discretion to allow. Tr. 340, L.18-341, L.3. This error was compounded by the court's
improper comments and the juror questions, discussed below. See also App. Br. Sec. L and S.
Appellants contend that pursuant to LC. 6-1014 and Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 186 (2009),
it was improper for the court to allow Ballard to repeatedly argue the CDC guidelines set a specific
standard of care. Further response to this issue is set forth infra under Section D. l.
2.

Without an adequate foundation, Dr. Sorensen could not establish a
violation of the community standard of practice, p. 27.

Ballard lists several opinions of Dr. Sorensen he contends established a violation of the
standard of practice. These opinions, however, are premised on the disputed assumption that Dr.
Appellants' Reply Brief - 7

Sorensen had actual knowledge of the standard of care applicable to Appellants. As a result, his
opinions cannot be relied upon as substantial and competent evidence to support the jury verdict.
3.

Ballard did not provide substantial and competent evidence of
proximate cause for the death of Krystal, p. 28.

A medical malpractice plaintiff must prove the defendant breached a duty and that this
breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho
775, 785 (2001). 7 Ballard did not prove the reusable medical equipment at issue was ever
contaminated with any bacteria. Instead, his expert merely assumes it was contaminated without
any proof of it. Tr. p. 492, L. 9-24. He also did not prove that bacteria were injected into the patient
by Appellants. Instead, his experts conclude inadequate steps were taken to minimize the risk of
contamination and they assume the instruments must have been contaminated. His brief cites
nothing in the record demonstrating he actually proved either of these causation propositions.
To get around this problem Ballard contends the testimony of his experts was sufficient to
establish "a chain of circumstances to allow the jury to reasonably and naturally infer the ultimate
fact." Res. Br. p. 32. He contends Dr. Sorensen explained the risks of not cleaning the equipment
properly and then makes the massive jump that the jury should be able to infer from this that the
gram negative bacteria must be from Dr. Kerr's instruments. Id. at 33-34, Tr. 342, L.4-20.
In support, Ballard relies heavily upon the testimony of Dr. Nichols regarding tissue slide

7 Ballard claims the defense should also lose on this issue because it did not move to exclude the
net opinions of Drs. Sorensen and Nichols on the issue of causation. Res. Br. p. 29. The defense
maintains this was not required as this court can exercise free review regarding the adequacy of the
evidence supporting the jury verdict. See Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 112 Idaho 726-27.
Appellants' Reply Brief - 8

B. He contends this slide conclusively "rules out" any claim the gram negative bacteria came from
anywhere other than the injection of the fat by Dr. Kerr. Appellants addressed previously why the
testimony of Dr. Nichols is contrary to that conclusion. 8 See App. Br. p. 20-26. Dr. Nichols'
testimony illustrates the fallacy of Ballard's contention that the verdict is supported by substantial
and competent evidence. Regarding this tissue sample Dr. Nichols admitted:
This is an actual piece of tissue which has been removed from her body. It's about
the size of a stamp and about as thick as a quarter. .. Since it wasn't recognized
before this slide was made, there is no way that the pathologist can tell you at this
point exactly what -- which of the gram negative organisms it is. But it is
microscopically a gram negative rod. You can see because of the staining that's done
with the hematoxylin and Iasin, the white blood cell reaction to the bacteria that are
present. So in my opinion, this shows that rather than being an inoculation through
the skin and deep, it is an inoculation that has occurred deep to the skin in a
horizontal fashion.
Tr. 558, L. 8-10; Tr. 559, L. 22-560, L. 9.
From a tissue sample no thicker than a quarter and the size of a stamp, Dr. Nichols

8 See also: 1) Testimony of Dr. Sorensen he assumed bacteria were injected into the buttocks of
Krystal during Dr. Kerr's procedure without proof by any means the bacteria entered the patient
during Dr. Kerr's surgery. Tr. 492, L.12-24; 2) Testimony of Dr. Kerr that bacteria found in the
patient did not come from his instruments and that he performed the fat transfer on the left buttocks
first using the exact same instruments as were later used to inject the fat into the patient's right
buttock. Tr. 2159, L.20-Tr. 2160, L.6; Tr. 2135, L.9; Tr. 2157, L.23-Tr. 2158, L.1; 3) Testimony
by Drs. Stiller and Lundeby that Appellants complied with the applicable standard of care. Tr. 1606,
L.17-25; Tr. 1799, L.5-1 O; 4) Testimony of Dr. Nichols, Plaintiffs pathologist, who agreed there
was nothing apparent as to how the gram negative bacteria were introduced into the patient's right
buttocks, and there was no evidence of an infectious process anywhere other than the right buttock.
Tr. 631, L. 22-Tr. 632, L.1; Tr. 571, L.10-Tr. 572, L.1; Tr. 565, L.20-25; Tr. 566, L.15-21; Tr. 564,
L.17-Tr. 565, L.12; and 5) Testimony of Dr. Coffman that the medical instruments were not the
source of the gram negative bacteria since if the patient's fat had been infected evidence ofinfection
would be seen in all surgery sites not just the right buttocks and because gram negative rods live in
the colon and not on skin. Tr. 1895, L.3-Tr. 1898, L.25; Tr. 1883, L. 9-19.
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testimony, which ignores all the other injection sites using the same equipment where no bacteria
was found, can hardly be deemed substantial and competent evidence upon which reasonable minds
would not differ that the deadly bacteria at issue was somehow injected by Appellants. The only
evidence on causation was provided by experts. The weight of evidence to the contrary was
overwhelming and included the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, Dr. Groben, who
opined he could not conclude the bacteria got into the right buttocks from instruments used by Dr.
Kerr, he had no idea how these bacteria got there, he ruled out everything he could. (See additional
support in FN 8-9). Dr. Groben testified there was nothing to tell where the bacteria came from and
one would need to ask an infectious disease expert if there was evidence the bacteria travelled from
the skin or from an injection site. Tr. p. 881, L.18-Tr. 882, L.2; Tr. 883, L.3-Tr. 884, L.11; Tr. 886,
L.11-21. In view of all this testimony, a reasonable jury could not conclude the gram negative rods
found in the right buttock of Krystal came from Appellants.
The issue of proximate cause in a medical malpractice case was discussed in Sheridan v. St.
Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 785 (2001 ). Sheridan alleged defendants failed to identify
and treat an infant for elevated bilirubin levels resulting in brain damage. After a defense verdict,
plaintiffs appealed and the hospital cross appealed the denial of its motion for a directed verdict due
to the lack of expert testimony on proximate cause. Id. at 785. This Court concluded the specific
language of I.C. 6-1012 does not expressly require proximate cause be shovvn by direct expert
testimony. Id. Instead, "testimony admissible to show proximate cause in a medical malpractice
case, like any other case, is governed by the rules of evidence regarding opinion testimony by lay
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witnesses and experts under I.RE. 701 and 702." Id. "While expert testimony may often be
necessary to establish proximate cause", the court stated that "proximate cause can be shown from
a "chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and
naturally inferable." Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 785, citing Formont v. Kircher, 91 Idaho 290 (1965).
See also Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140 (2009).
Sheridan argued substantial evidence was presented showing a chain of circumstances from
which proximate cause could be reasonably and naturally inferred. Id. at 786. The court agreed,
pointing to the fact the child had jaundice within 24 hours which was abnormal and for which the
nurses had failed to notify the physician in violation of the standard of practice. Id. Days later the
child was re-hospitalized with hyperbilirubinemia and then diagnosed with kernicterus, a form of
cerebral palsy directly associated with a neonatal history of elevated bilirubin, a symptom of which
is jaundice which the child left the hospital with. Id. For purposes of a directed verdict, the court
found a jury could reasonably and naturally infer from the chain of circumstances that the breach
in the first hospital stay proximately caused the child's injuries. Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 786.
The factual analysis in Sheridan is inapposite to the evidence of causation in this case. The
causation inferences advanced by Ballard are too numerous and tenuous to reasonably accept. He
asked the jury to draw conclusions that are not reasonable and natural to infer. Ballard argues that

if the reusable medical equipment was not properly cleaned and if the cleaners used by Appellants
were not effective and if the autoclave was not working properly and if gram negative bacteria was
somehow on the equipment to begin with that it could have contaminated the patient and it could
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have caused an infection somehow limited to being in only one of the many surgical sites. There is
no proof in the record any of these suppositions ever occurred. The jury could not naturally infer
the patient's death was due to improperly cleaned equipment under these facts.
This was not a reasonable and natural inference given the weight of the evidence to the
contrary including the complete absence of any other patient infections despite Appellants having
cleaned the equipment the exact same way for years - which the court refused to allow into evidence
as argued below. See infra Section D.5. The same reusable instruments were used to harvest and
re-inject the fat into the patient. Tr. 2255, L.8-2256, L.24; Tr. 1973, L.13-1977, L.24. The same
cleaning procedures had been used hundreds of times before with no other patient infections and
no indication these cleaning procedures or the autoclave were not effectively sterilizing the reusable
medical equipment. Tr. 1429, L.22-1431, L.4; Tr. 2099, L.17-2100, L.7. All the experts admit that
gram negative bacteria generally comes from one's colon and the defense was the only party to
present an infectious disease expert whose umebutted testimony was that the source of the gram
negative bacteria was not Dr. Kerr's instruments but rather the patient's colon. Tr. 1900, L.23-1901,
L.11. See add'l references App. Br. p. 21-23 and FN 8-9 herein.
It requires the willing suspension of disbelief under these facts for a jury to reasonably and

naturally infer the gram negative bacteria found at autopsy came from Appellants' reusable medical
equipment. Unlike the evidence in Sheridan that the infant actually had jaundice before he was
discharged which the nurses failed to evaluate, Ballard has no evidence connecting the bacteria
found at autopsy to Appellants. There was no evidence any gram negative bacteria ever existed on
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any of the instruments; no evidence of gram negative bacteria found anywhere but one of the
surgical sites despite the same equipment being used; no history of prior infections to suggest a
problem with the cleaning and sterilization procedures utilized by Appellants despite Ballard's
contention these procedures were inadequate. The existence of one or more of these key facts could
then give rise to a reasonable inference that the source of the bacteria found in the patient was more
likely than not from Appellants. No such testimony was offered in this case and for Ballard to
simply speculate that because Appellants did not clean the equipment the way he claims it should
have been cleaned, without more, is insufficient to support the jury verdict. 9
Ballard argues, without expert support, that the fact there was no bacteria found anywhere
but one spot in the right buttock was due to the fat being left in pristine condition. Res. Br. p. 3 7.
Ballard relies on Dr. Kerr's testimony that he did not use the Vaser device to break up the fat
harvested from Krystal's flanks that was placed in the canister for the fat transfer. Tr. 13 80, L.1116. Because this fat to be injected was placed in a separate canister, Ballard contends this made it
so only isolated contamination of the bacteria within the fat canister became plausible. This theory,
however, is readily dismissed both by common sense and by Dr. Kerr's unrefuted testimony

9 Additional evidence included: 1) biological indicators are of no benefit to identifying gram
negative bacteria; 2) no proof any bacteria survived the sterilization process used by Appellants or
that the autoclave was not working properly; 3) Dr. Kerr's autoclave used chemical indicators which
verify the autoclave reached the proper temperature and pressure to ensure sterilization; 4) the
majority of the instruments used came pre-packaged and sterile and were opened just before the
procedure; 5) the standard of care did not require the use of biological indicators, a separate clean
and dirty sink or a third party confirm the status of the autoclave. See Tr. 1542, L.12-Tr. 1546, L.12;
Tr. 1569, L.10-Tr. 1570, L.17; Tr. 1577, L.1-Tr. 1583, L.25; Tr. 1596, L.7-Tr. 1598, L.20.
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wherein he explained how the fat to be injected back into the patient was handled:
Now, the fat has gone into this canister. And along with the fat, we have suctioned
out some of the tumescence fluid. This fluid that's numbed her is also present, and
some of that will come out. In some people, it's very little, and in some people, it's
quite a bit. But it is saline, which is salt water, but it's water. Now, fat is lighter than
water and will float. So we usually give it a few minutes to settle, and it separates,
and the fat will float on top. And that's why you see this little port at the bottom. We
then can open this port and drain off the water part of it. Once that water part is
drained off, then I take a just a regular 20 gauge -- or, excuse me, 60 mil syringe,
and then I will suction fat into that.
Tr.1978, L.14-Tr.1979,L.10. (Emphasis added).
This testimony establishes that the fat harvested for injection into the patient was floating
in tumescent fluid which was then allowed to settle, separate and then drained so the fat could be
placed into the multiple sterile syringes. If the reusable fat canister had been contaminated with
bacteria as alleged, this bacteria would have been floating around freely within the canister. Just
like ink or dye would move throughout a fluid, (particularly when it was drained) any bacteria
would have infected the entire quantity of fat to be injected into the patient. Similarly, if the hollow
steel cannula through which every bit of fat passed on its way to the fat canister was not properly
sterilized, then every bit of fat which passed through the cannula on its way to the fat canister would
have been similarly contaminated with bacteria. Either scenario would have resulted in bacteria
being found at the autopsy in every location where the fat was injected and not limited to the one
spot on the right buttock. Ballard's theory is without merit.
Causation opinions from experts cannot be based on speculation and admitted assumptions.
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565 (2004) (Expert opinion that merely suggests possibilities
would only invite conjecture and may be properly excluded). Expert testimony which merely
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suggests possibilities is likewise insufficient to support the jury verdict at issue. Ballard would have
this Court conclude that all of the gram negative bacteria were somehow magically able to stay in
one spot within the canister despite being located inside a liquid mixture of fat and tumescent fluid
that was drained, drawn into syringes and injected into the patient. Tr. 1978, L.14-1979, L.10. As
demonstrated by Ex. T3, the fat was injected in a broad fanning pattern in multiple locations in each
buttock. There is no plausible way for the bacteria, if they came from Dr. Kerr's instruments as
alleged, to have been confined to only being injected into one spot. Tr. 1580, L. 2-23.
The evidence of causation advanced is not supported factually, nor does it serve to establish
a valid chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to prove causation can be
reasonably and naturally inferred. The prejudice suffered by Appellants on this issue was magnified
by the court's decision not to instruct the jury that Ballard must prove his case by direct expert
testimony, by using the snow example in modifying the circumstantial evidence instruction and by
failing to allow in evidence of a lack of other infections as argued herein. Thus, even if this Court
is satisfied Ballard established a violation of the standard of care, he did not and cannot prove the
element of causation. As a result, the jury verdict cannot be sustained on appeal.
C.

Ballard's Jury Instruction Section pages 39-52.
1.

Ballard fails to overcome the errors in the jury instructions given and
not given. p. 39.

Appellants assert as error the refusal of the court to give their requested jury instructions on
the elements of LC. 6-1012 and 6-1013, Instr. 11, 12, 13 and 17 and the error of the court in giving
its Instr. 5, 10 and 13. Ballard advances various conclusory statements that Appellants' arguments
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are incorrect, contrary to the record and applicable standard of review, failed to establish error or
prejudice, and are without merit. Appellants cite 22 cases in support of their contention the district
court erred in giving certain jury instructions and refusing to give certain jury instructions they
requested. These cases are cited in App. Br. at p. 26-47, 64-68. Every one of these cases are Idaho
Supreme Court decisions, spanning a period of 35 years up to the date of this brief.
Ballard only cites three cases from App. Br. On page 39, Puckett v. Verska is cited without
a description of its facts or discussion of the court's reasoning with only a brief statement that a
requested jury instruction need not be given if it is an erroneous statement of the law, adequately
covered by other instructions, or not supported by the facts. On page 43, Ramos v. Dixon is cited,
without a description of its facts, discussion or basis of the court's reasoning with only a brief
summary regarding the term "community" defined in I.C. 6-1012. On page 49 Pla. states "See
Sheridan, 135 Idaho 785-86." No description of the case is stated, nor does the brief specify the
facts, reasoning of the court or basis for the Court's decision. In Sheridan, the court stated expert
testimony may be necessary to establish proximate cause. Id. at 785. Thus, where the issue is
scientific or technical, Sheridan dictates that the use of an expert with specialized knowledge is
required.
Ballard concedes expert testimony was required to prove causation since the only evidence
of causation was provided by his experts. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, Dr.
Groben, testified he could not determine or conclude bacteria got into the right buttocks from
instruments used by Dr. Kerr, he had no idea how these bacteria got there and he ruled out
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everything he could. He testified there was nothing to tell where the bacteria came from. He deferred
to an infectious disease expert regarding any evidence where the bacteria travelled from. Tr. 881,
L.18-Tr. 882, L.2; Tr. 883, L.3-Tr. 884, L.11. In view of this testimony, a juror would not be able
to conclude the gram negative rods in the right buttock of Krystal came from the instruments used
by Dr. Kerr without competent expert testimony. This was confirmed by Ballard's pathology expert
Dr. Nichols, who testified Dr. Groben had performed a well-done examination, it was well thought
out and that he did the right things to try and prove what happened. Tr. 564, L.17-Tr. 565, L. 12.
Appellants contend the court erred in giving its Instr. 13 which contains the wording "you
are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled." R. 2496.
Res. Br. at p. 47-48 completely misses the point asserted in this claim of error. Ballard misstates
the position of Silk Touch that I. C. 6-1012 requires the jury to believe their experts' testimony,
when in fact the instruction given allows the jury not to be bound by the testimony of any expert,
leaving the jury to decide the case without expert testimony in the areas where expert testimony is
essential and required. Ballard omits reference to the part of Instr. 13 that constitutes the basis for
the assertion of error. Id. Ballard's argument is confined to factors the jury could consider in
determining the weight to assign the testimony of respective experts in order to determine which
expert to believe. His argument does not discuss the two sentences of Instr. 13 about not being
bound by the testimony of experts and the flawed legal justification for this part of said instruction.
Ballard's failure to mention this part oflnstr. 13 is tantamount to a concession the instruction was
error. Appellants' requested Instr. 7 does not contain the objectionable language. (R. 000819), and
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is a modified version ofIDJI 124.
Instr. 13 of the court contains language not included in the pattern instructions and Ballard
provides no legal authority supporting the objectionable wording coined by the district court.
Because of the wording of Instr. 13, the jury was wrongly instructed they could disregard the
following testimony of Ballard's only standard of health care practice expert Dr. Sorensen:
Q. I guess it's your opinion that gram negative rods were injected into the buttocks
of Krystal Ballard during Dr. Kerr's procedure, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Isn't it true that's just an assumption on your part?
A. Yes.
Tr. p. 492, L. 12 - 19.
Q. Isn't it true that there's no proof by any means of the fact that at the time of
surgery these gram negative bacteria went into her body. Isn't that true?
A. Yes.
Tr. p. 492, L. 20-24. (Emphasis added).
At p. 4 7, Ballard states "the only evidence presented on the sterilization practices of
providers with training similar to Dr. Kerr's was that of the respective experts of the parties. Thus,
it was unnecessary to inform the jury that the standard of care must be established through expert
testimony even if the jury instruction could be interpreted as urged by Silk Touch." This statement
is absurd and totally without supporting authority. Why would the court tell the jury during the trial
that Idaho law requires in all malpractice cases there must be expert testimony and then fail to give
instructions that embody this requirement? Tr. p. 2050, L.20-Tr. p.2051, L. 7. Without an instruction
on the requirement of expert testimony establishing that Dr. Kerr failed to meet the standard of
health care, the jury was at liberty to decide this issue based on its assessment of the evidence
despite the testimony of expert witnesses.
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App. Brief cites to the following cases that hold and approve the giving of jury instructions
in medical malpractice cases that recite and specify the elements of LC. 6-1012 and LC. 6-1013:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Morris By and Through Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138 (1997).
Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161 (2007).
Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628 (1987).
Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314 (1989).
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46 (2000).
Grimes v. Green, 113 Idaho 519 (1987).
Leazer v. Kiefer, 120 Idaho 902 (1991).
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176 (2009).
Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11 (2009).
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547 (2007).
Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126 (2003).
McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal, 144 Idaho 219 (2007).
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32 (2007).
Kolln v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323 (1997).

Appellants set forth the nature of these cases, issues decided, facts and holdings of the Court.
Of these cases, Schmechel v. Dille is significant and was unanimously decided by the current
members of this Court. Schmechel was a medical malpractice wrongful death case by the heirs of
Schmechel against Dr. Dille, Southern Idaho Pain Institute, and Thomas Byrne, P.A. Schmechel
sought treatment for ongoing pain and was evaluated by Mr. Byrne who prescribed the drug
methadone which Dr. Dille approved. Within a week, Schmechel died. At trial, the jury found for
the defense. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial which was denied.
Plaintiffs appealed, in part, on the jury instructions the court refused to give. This Court
ruled the trial court properly refused to give the instructions requested. In addressing this issue, at
page 183 of the decision, this Court quoted both LC. §6-1012 and 6-1013 and also cited Kolln v.
St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,334 (1997) which specifically relied on the legislature's
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intent in adopting LC. 6-1012. The following from the 1976 Idaho Sess. Laws at 277 was quoted:
"it is therefore, further declared to be in the public interest that the liability exposure of such health
care providers be limited and made more definable by a requirement for direct proof of departure
from a community standard of practice."
Schmechel requested jury instructions regarding negligence per se which the court refused
to give. In affirming the refusal to give the requested instructions, this Court held:
Instead of the Schmechels' requested instructions, the district court instructed the
jury that the Schmechels were required to prove negligence by direct expert
testimony that either Dr. Dille or Mr. Byrne, or both, breached the standard of care
for similarly trained and qualified health care professionals in Twin Falls, Idaho, at
the time they treated Mrs. Schmechel. The Schmechels allege that this was error
warranting a new trial. Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 185.
Exercising free review over the correctness of the jury instructions, this Court affirmed the
instructions given, holding negligence per se inapplicable in medical malpractice actions:
Thus, the Schmechels' requested instruction is an erroneous statement of the law,
and the district court was correct not to give it. The instruction that the district court
did give properly and adequately states the requirements of I.C. 6-1012 and 6-1013.
Thus, the court correctly instructed the jury on the requirements for proving
negligence. Schmechel, 148, Idaho at 185.
This Court reaffirmed direct expert testimony is required by I. C. 6-1012 and 6-1013. Id.
Thus, Schmechel stands for the proposition that where jury instructions in medical malpractice
cases are given that are inconsistent with the requirements of I.C. 6-1012 and 6-1013, it is reversible
error to do so. See also State ofldaho v. Kevin Brent Merwin, 131 Idaho 64 2, 64 7 (1998), wherein
the court stated: "we emphasize, however, that any court which varies from jury instructions
previously approved by this court does so at considerable risk that the verdict rendered will be
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overturned on appeal." (Emphasis added). 10
Next, Ballard does not challenge or discredit Appellants' contention the district court erred
in refusing to give Appellants' requested jury Instr. 13, that reads "the standard of health care
practice means the care typically provided under similar circumstances by the relevant type of
health care provider in the community at the time and place of the events in question." R. p. 825.
Instead, at p. 42 he states Appellants' proposed Instr. 11, 12, 13 and 17 only include two concepts
not addressed in the Court's instructions, namely that the standard of care must be proven by direct
expert testimony and that the term community refers to the geographical area ordinarily served by
the licensed general hospital where the medical care was provided. This is not correct as Appellants'
requested Instr. 13 specifically defines the meaning of standard of health care practice.
Dr. Sorensen, Ballard's only standard of health care practice expert, gave no testimony or
opinions on the standard defined in Defense Instr. 13, that his opinions and testimony reflected the
standard defined in Defense Instr. 13 or that he had actual knowledge of the standard defined
therein. Due to page limits, see App. Br. at p. 34-41 which relates to the district court's refusal to
give Appellants' requested Instr. 13 which Appellants contend constituted reversible error.
Ballard next contends that giving the district court's Instr. 8 and 9 (R. 2491 and 2492) were
in conformity with the pattern jury instructions and therefor it was not necessary to instruct the jury

10 This caveat was cited and approved in the civil case of Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 382
(Ct.App.2000), in which State v. Merwin was cited as precedent. This caveat was again approved
in Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 140 Idaho 416, 433 (2004) citing State v. Merwin.
Even though Merwin was a criminal case it is applicable to any case per Schaefer and Vendelin.
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on the elements of I. C. 6-1012 and the requested instructions of the Defense. He references Rule
51 (a)(2) as authority, although his brief does not cite to any cases that hold giving pattern jury
instructions constitute all the jury instructions required in a medical malpractice case. Rule 51 (a)(2)
does not say that IDJI instructions are the only instructions that must be given in a case.
There are several Idaho cases that deal with the position taken by Ballard. Vendelin v.
Costco Wholesale Corporation, 140 Idaho 416 (2004) involved error claimed by Costco for the
court's instruction relating to punitive damages. After citing Rule 51 (a)(2), the court stated "use of
the IDJI is not mandatory, only recommended. While it clearly is not error to modify an IDJ!
instruction, such modification will constitute error if the modified instruction does not conform to
the state of the law or omits elements basic to the case." Id. at 433. In Ramco v. H-K Contractors,
118 Idaho 108 (1990), H-K asserted the court erred in formulating its instructions to the jury. The
court gave a modified version of an IDJI instruction. The Supreme Court said "modification of an
IDJI instruction does constitute error if the modified instruction does not conform to the state of the
law or omits elements basic to the case." Id. at 111, citing Anreason v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813 ( 197 6).
See also Schaefer v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct.App.2000) (citing same language).
Similarly, Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171, 104 Idaho 604 (Ct.App.1983) involved the
wrongful death of a child whose parents sued the school district for negligence. The school district
asserted error in refusing to give its requested jury instruction. While the case was pending on
appeal, the Supreme Court issued a revised volume of pattern jury instructions. The court ruled:
pattern jury instructions are not a separate source of substantive law, rather they seek
to embody existing law. They are recommendatory in nature, not mandatory.
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I.R.C.P. 5 l(a)(2). Thus, the substantive standard by which the jury instruction in this
case should be judged is not a subsequently promulgated pattern instruction, but the
underlying case law." Id. at 612.
This quote is directly relevant to the jury instruction issues in this appeal. None of the cases
cited by Appellants, which state that the jury should be instructed a plaintiff has the burden of
proving by direct expert testimony the defendant failed to meet the applicable standard of health
care practice of the community, I.C. 6-1012, hold or rule that there are exceptions to this
requirement such as by virtue of the IDJI jury instructions. At p. 47, Ballard states it was
um1ecessary to inform the jury that the standard of care must be established through expert
testimony. At p. 46, he argues the IDJI instructions eliminate the need of instructing the jury the
standard of care must be established through expert testimony.
These statements are contradicted and rejected by the Supreme Court decision in Leazer v.
Kiefer, 120 Idaho 902, 905-906 (1991) which held jury instructions based on Idaho's medical
malpractice statutes is required regardless of pattern jury instructions. In Leazer, the Court quoted
from LePelley v. Grefensen, 101 Idaho 422 (1980), and Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628
(1987) in support of its holding. Ballard does not mention these cases which is tantamount to an
admission they are correct and authoritative on this issue.
If the Court accepts Ballard's argument, it will render the requirement of I.C. 6-1012 for

direct expert testimony nugatory and totally frustrate the legislature's intent in enacting I.C. 6-1012
and 6-1013 by judicial proclamation - something the judicial branch is not empowered to do. It will
overrule a long line of Supreme Court decisions that approve the giving of jury instructions that
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embody LC. 6-1012 and 6-1013. The pattern jury instructions given by the district court as Instr. 8
and 9 do not supersede or void the requirements of LC. 6-1012 and 6-1013. Pla. does not
distinguish, repudiate or even discuss the multitude of cases cited by Appellants regarding the
applicability of jury instructions based on LC. 6-1012 and 6-1013 and Appellants' Instr. 13, 11 and
17 and in particular the holdings in Schmechel and Leazer in which this Court affirmed the use of
jury instructions based on I.C. 6-1012 and 6-1013 regardless of any pattern jury instructions.
The district court refused to give Defense Instr. 17. See R. 829. This instruction is based on
I.C. 6-1012. In refusing to give this instruction, the Judge wrote on it "not necessary." R. 829. This
is the opposite of and repugnant to the statement the court made before the jury: "I will instruct the
jury that the standard of care is the applicable standard of health care practice of the community in
which such care allegedly was or should have been provided." Tr. p. 2050, L.20-25. No other
instruction given by the court embraced this statement. The court's Instr. 8 and 9 defining Ballard's
burden of proof do not, despite the ruling in Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167 (2007).
Puckett provided that the instructions actually given to the jury "adequately covered what
Puckett needed to prove regarding the standard of care for a medical malpractice action," including
an instruction on the definition of community using the statutory definition provided in I .C. 6-1012.
Id. at 167(emphasis added). I.C. 6-1012 provides in part "the term community refers to that
geographical area ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care
was or allegedly should have been provided." At trial, Ballard did not prove this element.
At p. 41, Ballard states that in responding to an objection during the trial the district court
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properly instructed the jury quoting the court at Tr. p. 2050, L. 22-Tr. 2051, L. 8. The statement
that the court was instructed the jury is not true. The quoted statement was not an instruction, but
rather a recitation of a portion of LC. 6-1012 with the words "the standard of care is the applicable
standard of health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or should have
been provided." It is significant that the court did not give a jury instruction which embodied the
above quoted statement of the court. Appellants' requested Instr. 11 contained the quoted language
the district court refused to give (R. p. 823) which contains the hand-written notation of the court
that it was already covered with the IDJI which is inaccurate.
At p. 42, Ballard states the admissibility of the opinions of Dr. Sorensen and Dr. Nichols is
not at issue in this appeal, nor relevant to whether the jury was correctly instructed. At p. 43-45, he
describes the testimony of Dr. Sorensen he contends establishes the definition of community was
unnecessary. This testimony, however, did not prove the community requirement of I.C. 6-1012
which the court confirmed in Puckett needed to be proven. Puckett, 144 Idaho at 167. Finally,
Ballard states because the jury only heard evidence of one community, the additional language in
Appellants' requested instruction defining community was unnecessary. This is an illogical and
erroneous statement since the jury was never instructed on the definition of community which
means there was no evidence of even one community as defined in I.C. 6-1012.
2.

The district court gave an erroneous instruction defining circumstantial
evidence which unfairly prejudiced the defense, p. 48.

The court erred in giving its Instr. 5 because it contained the words "if you don't see it
snowing but wake up and find the ground is covered in snow, then you have circumstantial evidence
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that it snowed." R. 2488. Ballard contends this instruction presented no risk of the jury concluding
that just because Krystal died several days after surgery that Dr. Kerr must have violated the
standard of care and caused her death and Appellant failed to establish any error, let alone reversible
error. Pla. does not demonstrate a basis, factual or legal per Idaho law, for this conclusion. IDJI
1.24.2 does not contain the snow example and the comments to IDJI 1.24.2 state the definition of
the term circumstantial is unnecessary. The wording about snow constitutes a definition of
circumstantial evidence coined solely by the District Judge.
Because there was no factual evidence that Dr. Kerr actually injected bacteria into the right
buttock of Krystal, the snow example in the instruction was a perfect way for the jury to conclude
that since Dr. Kerr operated and bacteria was found in the right buttock of Krystal a few days later,
the bacteria must have come from the instruments used by Dr. Kerr. During an exchange between
the court and Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. McKay, at the jury instruction conference, it appears from the
trial transcript the court added the words about snow as a favor for Ballard. The district court read
aloud it's Instr. 5 with the wording on snow and then asked Mr. McKay "would that help you." Tr.
2323, L. 10-25. The response was:
Mr. McKay: It would I think that. ..
The Court: Because I think that when you start talking about in terms of philosophy
major verbiage, sometimes people glaze over a tad.
Mr. McKay: I think that would be a fair instruction and appropriate and would allow
us, I think, then to argue proximate cause in the context of that instruction.
Tr. p. 2324, L.1-8.
The court's Instr. 5 states "circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the
fact, by proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred." This is immediately
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followed by the snow example, which is confusing and inconsistent with the preceding part of the
instruction. Just because the ground is covered in snow doesn't mean it snowed unless there are
facts that show the snow did not get there for some other reason or that it even snowed, since snow
can be on the ground for a number of other reasons. App. Br. addresses this point at p.41.
Ballard acknowledges there are no Idaho appellate court cases involving similar language
about snow in the context of circumstantial evidence. Defense counsel has also not found any Idaho
cases utilizing the snow example used by the court's Instr. 5. Ballard ignores the limits of the pattern
instruction set forth in IDJI 1.24.2, and instead relies on three criminal cases from other jurisdictions
without stating whether these jurisdictions have a pattern instructions like IDJI 1.24.2. Ballard did
not find a civil case from any jurisdiction using the snow example like the one used by the court in
Instr. 5.
In support, Ballard cites Thomas v. State, 350 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). Thomas
involved a criminal defendant charged with battery. The decision does not include the actual jury
instruction making it of limited relevance. It is not clear from the decision whether the snow
example was simply verbally stated to the jury or included in a written jury instruction. Id. at 254.
He also cites State v. Kaszas, 1998 WL 598530 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). Kaszas involved a
criminal defendant convicted of attempted murder. One issue on appeal dealt with the
circumstantial evidence instruction given. A review of the actual instruction, however, strongly
favors the arguments advanced by the defense. Id. at * 17-18. The instruction given did not limit its
explanation of circumstantial evidence to whether snow was seen falling or just on the ground.
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Instead, the court gave an expansive instruction which made it clear that when drawing upon
inferences from proven facts the jury was not permitted to base one inference upon another
inference and that each inference must be predicated or based upon a proven fact. Id. No such
explanation was given in this case. Instead, the jury was given a broadly worded snow example
without sufficient context along with other improper instructions which allowed the jury to decide
the case based on their own personal beliefs rather than upon direct expert testimony.
Ballard also cites to State v. Cipriano, 21 A.3d 408 (R.I. 2011). Cipriano involved two
criminal defendants convicted of receiving stolen goods. One issue on appeal dealt with the refusal
to give certain inference jury instructions which are not relevant. Id. at 423. Instead, the court gave
a circumstantial evidence instruction utilizing snow comparable to the instruction discussed above
in Kaszas. For these reasons, Cipriano does not support the use of the snow example in this case.
3.

The district court erred in giving the pattern instruction on negligence,
p. 51.

The court erred in giving its Instr. 10. See R. 2493. Ballard's response is devoid of authority
on this issue. The pattern malpractice instructions, IDJI 2.10.1 through IDJI 2.10.3, do not specify
Instr. 10 and there are no Idaho decisions that approve or authorize giving Instr. 10 in a medical
malpractice case. Instr. 10 does not refer to a physician and its obvious flaw is the fact that
negligence in a medical malpractice case is established solely by the testimony of expert witnesses,
not what a reasonably careful person would do or not do. Furthermore, there was no proof or
testimony in this case as to what a reasonably careful person would or not do and there was no
factual basis for giving the instruction. Instr. 10 allowed the jury to decide if Appellants failed to
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comply with the standard of health care practice based on what they deemed a reasonably careful
person would or would not do, instead of the testimony of experts which Idaho law requires. This
instructional error was fatal to the defense of the Appellants. See App. Br. p. 45.
4.

Absent expert testimony, the district court erred by allowing the jury to
be instructed on and consider the issue of recklessness, p. 52.

Ballard argues Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11 (2009) stands for the proposition that
expert testimony is not required to prove recklessness. This contention was refuted in Jones:
The district court allowed the two experts to testify as to what conduct they would
characterize as reaching a level of negligence that they saw as reckless. This
testimony was permissible because (1) the experts had acquainted themselves
adequately with the community standard for health care providers such as Kurtz, and
(2) their opinions as to the level of negligence of her conduct were not conclusions
that the average juror would be qualified to draw. Idaho Code § 6-1012 requires
expert testimony to prove that a health care provider is negligent; therefore, the
testimony of Dr. Benumof and Ms. Heller is precisely what the statute contemplates.
Jones, 147 Idaho at 17. (Emphasis added).
The only causation evidence presented in Jones was by experts. In Jones, the medical device
in question had an explicit warning on it against using it the very way it was used which in tum
directly resulted in the patient's death. Id. The court said this factual circumstance required expert
testimony which is precisely what the defense contends Ballard failed to do in the case at bar. The
balance of this case is discussed in App. Br. at p. 66-68. Ballard maintains the jury was qualified to
weigh the testimony and determine whether the conduct was reckless. Appellants disagree. This
would mean that while expert testimony is required to prove a violation of the standard of care
under LC. 6-1012, that no expert opinion is needed to establish the issue of recklessness on matters
beyond those of an average lay person. See the discussion of Sheridan supra at Section B.3.
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D.

The district court erred by way of its numerous evidentiary rulings, p. 55.

Appellants presented substantial evidence that the district court abused its discretion
involving its evidentiary rulings sufficient to justify reversing the verdict of the jury.

1.

The district court erred in ruling Dr. Sorensen did not have to
familiarize himself with the local standard of practice, p. 55.

This issue relates directly to the court's improper comments regarding the challenged
foundation for Dr. Sorensen. See App. Br. p. 39-40 and supra Section B. l. The actual statements
by the court were: "Well, he practices in the community already. He knows what the community
standards are on the date and time. He doesn't have to talk to somebody else. It's not an out-of-state
expert .... But I am unaware of any requirement that a person who practices in the local area and
is familiar with the standards of care in the local area has to do to consult with instate people in the
way that an out-of-state expert does." Tr. 475, L.3-476, L.21.
It was improper for the Court to pronounce to the jury that Dr. Sorensen did not have to
familiarize himself with the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr. This is the ruling which
was harmful error. Ballard contends local practitioners are not required to consult with other local
practitioners regarding the applicable standard of practice. Res. Br. p. 58. This is not a correct
statement of the law as set forth in App. Br. at p. 40-41. There was no evidence Dr. Sorensen spoke
with anyone familiar with the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Kerr at or near the July 2010
time frame when the care was rendered. As a physician of a different specialty than Dr. Kerr, LC.
6-1012 requires Dr. Sorensen to provide a proper foundation for his opinions which was not done.
Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284 (2005) does not support Ballard because plaintiffs
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expert in that case was shown to have worked with and practiced alongside family practice
physicians like the defendant during the time in question. Id. at 289. There is no evidence in this
case that Dr. Sorensen ever spoke with anyone functioning in a cosmetic surgery practice setting
like Dr. Kerr regarding the time period in question despite the fact he admitted there were several
physicians he could have spoken to regarding the 2010 timeframe. See Tr. 329, L.2-330, L.19.
He next contends Dr. Sorensen was a cosmetic rather than a plastic surgeon and therefore
of the same specialty as Dr. Kerr without any need to familiarize himself. Dr. Sorensen's own
website, which the defense was not permitted to use to impeach him with, disproves this argument
and shows that he specifically considered himself a plastic surgeon, not a cosmetic surgeon. See
Section D.3. infra. In addition, the Idaho Board of Medicine considers Dr. Sorensen to be a plastic
and not a cosmetic surgeon. See secure.bom.idaho.gov/BOMPublic/LicensePublicRecord.aspx?
Board=BOM&LicenseType=M&LicenseNo=2958 (last accessed on 10/29/15). These were issues
for the jury to decide without the court making an improper pronouncement to the jury.
Ballard contends that even if the court erred it was harmless because the jury was instructed
none of the court's rulings were intended to indicate an opinion concerning the evidence. R. 2482.
This instruction is insufficient to overcome the effect of the court's statements made days earlier.
It did not inform the jury that where the court advanced an improper comment on a party's

obligation to establish a proper foundation for an expert's opinion that such a comment should be
disregarded.
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2.

The district court erred in preventing Dr. Kerr from testifying as to who
establishes the standard of practice, p. 59.

Ballard attempts to distinguish Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169 (2014) by contending it
supports the actions taken by the district court. Tr. 2049, L.25 to 2050, L. l. He misapplies the basis
for which Bybee was cited by Appellants. Bybee reaffirms the longstanding rule of LC. 6-1012 that
the standard of health care practice is established solely by direct expert testimony. This is what the
question posed to Dr. Kerr was intended to elicit and it was error for the court to conclude the
question was directed at a legal issue. See App. Br. p. 49-50.
3.

The district court abused its discretion in failing to allow the defense to
cross examine Dr. Sorensen regarding his website, p. 61.

Ballard asserts Dr. Sorensen is a cosmetic surgeon, not a plastic surgeon, and that he is
therefore the same specialty as Dr. Kerr. Res. Br. p. 23-26. In this section of his brief, however, he
argues the opposite. Ballard contends there was no reason for the defense to cross-examine Dr.
Sorensen regarding whether he held himself out to the public as a plastic surgeon in direct
competition with Dr. Kerr and who warned readers of his website they should not go to providers
who were not plastic surgeons. Ballard contends that because the website was discussed during
opening statements there was no reason to allow it to be explored on cross-examination. Such a
contention is without merit as the arguments of counsel in openings are not evidence. See IDJI 1.00;
State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 906 (Ct. App. 1982).
As outlined in App. Br. at p. 47, the question by Ballard to Dr. Sorensen did not ask what
his website said, but rather why it was created. Dr. Sorensen's website (Ex. MM and NN) included
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far more information than was disclosed in his direct testimony. Dr. Sorensen's website criticized
providers like Dr. Kerr and recommended readers stay away from them. Id. Dr. Sorensen testified
that despite what he stated on his website he did not have any bias against cosmetic surgeons like
Dr. Kerr. Tr. 330, L.20-Tr. 331, L. 22. Dr. Sorensen confirmed that he composed the content on
his website and that he represented himself as being a plastic rather than a cosmetic surgeon. Tr.
426, L.7-18; Tr. 424, L.20-Tr. 430, L.9; Tr. 427, L.2-Tr. 429, L.6; Tr. 522, L.9-Tr.523, L.10. Dr.
Sorensen is in direct competition with Dr. Kerr and his websites were an excellent example of his
biased belief that patients should avoid going to non-plastic surgeons for liposuction procedures
just like the one performed on Krystal. As Ballard's only expert, it was essential he be fairly
discredited, impeached and shown to be biased against physicians like Dr. Kerr. As stated in State
v. White, 97 Idaho 708 (1976):
A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of crossexamination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior
motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the
case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is
'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony.' We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in
testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right
of cross-examination. This court has consistently held that where a defendant is
seeking on cross-examination to show bias or test the credibility of the complaining
witness, the trial court should allow considerable latitude.
White, 97 Idaho at 713 (emphasis added).
Ballard cites I.R.E. 6 l 3(b) dealing with admissibility of extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement and suggests that this legal authority was required to be pointed out.
Appellant disagrees. The basic right to cross-examination the district court unfairly interfered with
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was discussed in App. Br. at p. 47-49. Dr. Sorensen admitted he put his warning about non-plastic
surgeons on his web site "six or seven years ago" during his direct examination. Tr. 425, L.2-8. The
website materials were recent and impeached his testimony that his prior concerns were no longer
applicable. The website information proved Dr. Sorensen's statement was not a consistent
statement. The website was direct evidence of current and impeaching bias which Dr. Sorensen had
towards non-plastic surgeons like Dr. Kerr performing liposuction in the area. Such an inquiry was
not an undue waste of time and it was an abuse of discretion for the court to preclude it.
4.

The district court erred in refusing to admit Ex. H, the unredacted
complete medical chart of Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch, p. 64.

Ballard asserts his Ex. 5, the records of Silk Touch and Dr. Kerr were "redacted m
accordance with the court's in limine rulings." Res. Br. p. 64. This contention is not supported by
any reference to the record and is disputed. Ballard also argues the defense waived this issue by not
objecting to the court admitting Ex. 5. There was no reason to object to this exhibit considering the
defense intended to admit the entire unredacted chart during its case-in-chief as defense Ex. H
which is expressly allowed per IRE 106. Appellants cannot be deemed to have waived this issue
when it did not ripen until the defense was not permitted to admit Ex. H. 11
Ballard argues this issue was resolved in the first trial, however, he did not move in limine

11 Further proof comes from the court early in the trial regarding defense exhibits: "So I'm not
precluding the defense from getting to exhibits that maybe we didn't have a chance to get in because
of the stage we stopped previously." Tr. 521, L.10-13. In addition, IRE 106 allows the remainder
of a statement like the handwritten entries by Dr. Kerr in his medical records to be introduced where
fairness requires it to be considered.
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to redact or limit the information within the Silk Touch records. See Res. Motions in Limine R.
874-876; R. 2141-43. Also, the first trial was not completed which meant the defense was never
able to address the use of the full unredacted medical record, Ex. H. During the first and second
trial defense counsel listed the entire record of Dr. Kerr and Silk Touch as Ex. H. See R. 1754; R.
2351. During the first trial, the defense was not permitted to make a record regarding its desire to
utilize the unredacted Ex. H due to the mistrial.
Ballard contends further transcripts from the first trial are necessary to address this issue.
This is not correct as the transcripts included on appeal demonstrate the complete record for this
issue. During the testimony of Dr. Stiller, defense counsel sought to address this very issue the day
the mistrial was granted. 12 This is evidenced by the defense requesting several exhibits, including
Ex. H, be provided to Dr. Stiller for use during his testimony. 11/14/13 Tr. 12, L.7-12. The court
agreed the witness could be given all of the requested exhibits with the following exception:
THE COURT: Except I'm going to require that Exhibit 5, instead of H be used.
There is not [sic] sense in having duplicate Dr. Kerr records, so go ahead.
11/14/13 Tr. 76, L.1-4.
The Court's comments prove there was no in prior in limine ruling regarding redactions to
Ex. 5 or H. The court shortly thereafter granted a mistrial without Appellants ever having any
opportunity to address or make an offer of proof regarding Ex. H. 11 /14/13 Tr. 108, L.8-9. It was

12 Ballard references Appellants' concern about running afoul of the court's in limine order. Of
course Appellants were concerned: the court never entered a written order, Appellants repeatedly
requested clarification from the court on what was or was not contained or covered by its order and,
most importantly, the court already granted one mistrial and repeatedly threatened the defense with
granting another and striking defenses of Appellants. See App. Br. Section L; Tr. 1388-90.
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not until the second trial that this issue could be addressed as explained in App. Br. at p. 68-7 4.
During the second trial there was no discussion regarding Ex. 5 beyond Ballard admitting he had
taken it upon himself to make the same redactions as before. Tr. 317, L.4-10; Tr. 318, L.1-3. For
these reasons, this issue is properly before the court on appeal.
Ballard does not address the prejudicial impact this issue had on the defense and instead
contends the jury was somehow already aware of most of the redacted information. Res. Br. p. 66.
This argument is disputed and misses the point because it is not only whether the jury was aware
of some of the information in the redacted records, but how they became aware. Ballard repeatedly
challenged the veracity of Dr. Kerr at trial and the use of his unredacted contemporaneous
handwritten records would have rehabilitated him and supported the defense theory of the case
regarding causation. The redactions from Dr. Kerr's medical records were an abuse of discretion
by the court which unfairly prejudiced the defense. See App. Br. p. 68-74.

5.

The district court exceeded its discretion by refusing to admit evidence
showing a lack of other patient infections, p. 66.

Ballard's response focuses on the court's refusal to admit Ex. AA. While the refusal to admit
this exhibit is part of this issue, the larger issue was the refusal to allow evidence of no other postoperative infections involving any of the other 288 liposuction and fat transfer cases performed at
Dr. Kerr's office. The court refused to allow this testimony despite Dr. Sorensen's deposition
testimony that a lack of postoperative complications was the very best evidence that Dr. Kerr was
properly cleaning his reusable equipment. R. 1936, L.8-16.
Ballard does not oppose or distinguish the case authorities discussed by Appellants
Appellants' Reply Brief - 36

regarding the admissibility of other incidents to oppose allegations of negligence. He also does not
dispute the severe prejudice to Appellants caused by the inability to offer evidence at trial regarding
a lack of any other patient infections, particularly in response to the issue of recklessness and for
purposes of impeaching Dr. Sorensen with his deposition testimony identified above. Instead,
Ballard contends Ex. AA was excluded on the alternative ground it was not timely disclosed as
opposed to being excluded on relevance grounds which he now appears to concede.
In doing so, Ballard provides an incomplete procedural history regarding Ex. AA omitting
key facts including his failure to timely engage in discovery per the court's scheduling order
deadlines and failure to timely serve a notice of deposition duces tecum. These omitted facts were
discussed repeatedly after the first trial and during the second trial. See Memo in Opposition R.
1961-64; Aff' d of Counsel Offer of Proof Re: Dr. Kerr R. 2417-49; and Defense offer of proof at
trial regarding the relevance of a lack of other infections Tr. 2098, L.17-Tr. 2103, L.7. These
references and the detailed factual description which are incorporated herein include copies of all
relevant documents which further support and establish the defense position and refute Ballard.
Ballard alternatively contends the exhibit was properly excluded per Rule 1006 regarding
summaries presented in the form of charts. Ex. AA sets forth 288 patients by first name, location
of liposuction procedure and date of procedure. Supp. R. 55-62; R. 2422-29. It does not refer to
complications or infections involving other patients. It was offered to demonstrate Dr. Kerr's
experience in performing the procedures at issue to rebut Ballard's claim that Dr. Kerr was not
experienced because he only attended a weekend course on liposuction. Tr.774, L.2-6.
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Ballard also sought to preclude Dr. Kerr from being able to discuss his expenence
performing other liposuction and fat transfer procedures at all because the medical records for all
of these other patients had not been disclosed. Tr. 526, L.6-527, L.7. The court overruled this
objection and allowed Dr. Kerr to testify as to how many procedures he performed. It was error for
the court to allow this, but then preclude Dr. Kerr from testifying as to whether he had experienced
any prior infections involving those same patients without having produced all of their medical
records. These opposite positions cannot be maintained and demonstrate the district court's error if
the failure to disclose medical records is to be the alleged basis for exclusion of this evidence.

It is routine in a medical malpractice case for a defendant physician, just like any expert
witness, to discuss his/her experience without producing proof of everything he/she has ever done.
Opposing counsel was free to cross examine and try to impeach the witness regarding such
foundational background experiences, but to simply preclude the witness from testifying on that
topic because he/she did not disclose the medical records for each patient ever treated exceeded the
outer bounds of the court's discretion.
Ballard next argues the court had the right to exclude lack of infection testimony as a
sanction under Rules 37 (b) and 26( e)(4) for failing to produce the underlying data. He does not
provide any analysis of case authority and instead cites cases generally for propositions advanced. 13

13 At p. 71, Ballard states the basis for other patients not suffering any infections came from Dr.
Kerr's wife, however, no supporting citation to the record is provided. Instead, the evidence offered
but refused showed Dr. Kerr had direct and personal knowledge regarding his patients and whether
they suffered any postoperative infections. R. 932, L.11-25; Tr. 2098, L.17-Tr. 2103, L.7.
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Ballard cites to McKim v. Homer, 143 Idaho 568, 571 (2006) for the proposition the court may
impose sanctions under Rule 37(b) including striking testimony based on late disclosure. The facts
in McKim, however, support the position advocated by Appellants. McKim involved the exclusion
of a lay witness which plaintiff conceded was not disclosed until after the discovery deadline. Id. at
571. On appeal, the court noted that considering all the facts, the district court acted within the
bounds of its discretion and by exercise of reason excluding the witness. Id.
The rationale applied in McKim is inapposite to the district court's decision to exclude Ex.
AA and evidence relating to a lack of other patient infections. Unlike the late disclosure in McKim,
Ballard took the deposition of Dr. Kerr almost nine months prior to trial in which Dr. Kerr testified
that he had not experienced any other patient infections. R. 932, L.11-25. Dr. Kerr's opinions on
these issues were specifically included in his expert witness disclosure made over five months prior
to the first trial. R. 1050-51. Ballard then waited until after the end of discovery to try and seek the
medical records upon which Dr. Kerr's deposition testimony was based to which the defense
properly objected. R. 1961-64; R. 2417-49; Tr. 2098, L.17-Tr. 2103, L.7. If the district court's
decision to exclude the evidence of other patient infections is based upon a discovery sanction under
Rules 37(b) or 26( e)( 4), Appellants contend the result in McKim aptly demonstrates why the district
court exceeded the outer boundaries of its discretion. McKim, 143 Idaho at 571.
Finally, Ballard contends Appellants did not lay an adequate foundation that the other
liposuction and fat transfer procedures were sufficiently similar such that they were relevant. Res.
Br. p. 72. Ballard does not provide any case authority in support. His theory at trial was that
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Appellants did not properly clean the reusable medical equipment used in general on patients like
Krystal. Evidence that this equipment was cleaned the same way every time, for every patient for
years, and that no other patient had experienced a postoperative infection was directly relevant to
rebut this claim. The fact that Dr. Kerr was allowed to testify as to how many procedures he
performed (Tr. 1308, L.12-21) and his daughter was allowed to testify that she cleaned the
equipment the same way every time (Tr. 1429, L.22-Tr. 1431, L.4), but the court then refused to
allow the most critical testimony regarding the lack of other infections exceeded the outer bounds
of the court's discretion based on the authorities set as forth in App. Br. p. 86-93.
6.

The district court erred by not allowing Dr. Sorensen to be cross
examined regarding types of gram negative bacteria, p. 73.

The court exceeded its discretion by precluding the cross-examination of Dr. Sorensen
regarding the basis for his causation opinion that the bacteria found in one spot in the right buttock
came from Dr. Kerr's instruments and nowhere else. 14 When the court overruled the defense
objection that Dr. Sorensen had not laid a proper foundation for his opinions, (Tr. 342, L.4-20) the
defense was entitled to cross-examine him as to the basis for his opinion. 15 It was error for the court
to preclude a fair cross examination of the basis for such an opinion. See App. Br. p. 58-60. The

14 Ballard contends the court's ruling precluding further cross examination of Dr. Sorensen was
not based on relevance. The transcript clearly reflects the contrary. Tr. 455, L 7-16; Tr. 457, L 47.
15 At p. 30, FN 13, Ballard contends Appellants failed to specify how the foundation was deficient,
citing Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,473 (2013). Both Hansen and Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho
916, 922 (2004), state that an objection can be preserved for appellate review either by a specific
objection or where the basis for the objection is apparent from the context.
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remaining questions allowed did not serve to cure the court's error as the court precluded the main
point of attack that Dr. Sorensen did not have the necessary expertise to render such an opinion.
7.

The district court erred in allowing Dr. Sorensen to render his
observations comparing the prior testimony of Dr. Kerr, p. 74.

During Ballard's direct examination of Dr. Sorensen, several portions of Dr. Kerr's
deposition and discovery responses were read to him. Tr. 356, L.17-366, L.9. Over defense
objection, Dr. Sorensen was then allowed to render an expert opinion regarding whether Dr. Kerr's
testimony was "consistent' between his deposition and discovery responses regarding factual
issues. Tr. 366, L. 10-367, L. 1. This is not the purpose of medical expert testimony. Pursuant to
I.R.E. 702, an expert witness is limited to providing an opinion where "[i]f scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue .... " Ballard does not cite any case or make any effort to distinguish the authorities
cited by Appellants on this issue. Instead, he contends Dr. Sorensen was fairly called upon to "draw
on his expertise in sterilization" in commenting on whether Dr. Kerr had referred to utilizing an
enzymatic cleaner in his testimony. Res. Br. p. 74. The questions phrased to Dr. Sorensen, however,
were not aimed at drawing upon his expertise, but rather simply asking him from a lay person
perspective whether the testimony was consistent or not. This is not an area for which Dr.
Sorensen's expertise was required. The jury alone was to decide whether it was consistent and it
was harmful error for the court to overrule this objection. App. Br. p. 60-61.
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8.

The district court erred by not allowing Dr. Stiller to rebut the causation
opinions of Dr. Sorsensen, p. 76.

Ballard contends the question at Tr. 1605, L.16-Tr. 1606, L.13 was redundant and proper to
exclude. Ballard does not provide any references to the transcript showing where the issue had been
covered elsewhere in Dr. Stiller's testimony such that it would be proper to exclude it per Rule 403.
The defense maintains the issue had not been covered and that it was a fair question to rebut the
standard of practice and causation opinions advanced by Dr. Sorensen. The subsequent objection
based on speculation is also without merit. Tr. p. 1606, L. 1-3. To allow Dr. Sorensen, a retained
plastic surgeon, to render the opinion that the patient's death was caused by improperly cleaned
surgical instruments despite no evidence the instruments were ever contaminated with bacteria to
begin with can hardly be any less speculative than allowing Dr. Stiller, a general and cosmetic
surgeon, to testify that in his opinion even if everything had been cleaned the way Dr. Sorensen
says it should have been that the patient would still not be alive because the source of the bacteria
was not from Dr. Kerr's instruments, but from stool from her own colon. The question to Dr. Stiller
went to the very heart of rebutting Ballard's causation opinion which was advanced without a proper
foundation by Dr. Sorensen to begin with. The court exceeded its discretion by allowing Dr.
Sorensen to render such opinions and then precluding the defense from rebutting it claiming it was
either speculative or cumulative. See App. Br. p. 61.
E.

The district court exceeded the outer boundaries of its discretion by improperly
commenting on the evidence and questioning witnesses, p. 77.

Ballard accuses Appellants of misrepresenting the record and that specific assignments of
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error are lacking and too indefinite for purposes of appeal. The evidence below is to the contrary.
1.

The district court erred in allowing Ballard to testify that compliance
with the CDC was required, p. 78.

Ballard starts by addressing the district court's improper reference to certain guidelines of
the CDC being required. Res. Br. p. 78. Despite the unfairly prejudicial nature of the court's
comments, Ballard suggests this Court should ignore it, concluding they must simply be a
transcription error or a misstatement by the court. The record reflects this was a repeated
pronouncement by the court. See Tr. 1921, L.9-Tr. 1922, L.23. The transcript reveals that the court
stated to the jury that the CDC guidelines were required to be followed twice in the span of ruling
on one objection. This was not taken out of context by Appellants. These were improper comments
on the evidence on disputed issues which unfairly prejudiced the defense.
At p. 78, Ballard contends that no witness said any particular statutory or regulatory standard
was mandatory. This statement is directly refuted by the testimony of his own expert, Dr. Sorensen,
who gave the following answer to a court asked juror questions:
THE COURT: Okay. The sterilization guidelines were mentioned. Are these
required standards for -- are there required standards for sterilization as well?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Tr. p. 513, L.4-8. (Emphasis added).
This question was pivotal and reveals that the jury itself understood from Dr. Sorensen's
testimony that compliance with the CDC guidelines was absolutely required to ensure sterilization
of the reusable medical equipment in order to comply with the standard of care. This proves the
improper effect of the testimony. See also App. Br. p. 51-52. Other examples of Dr. Sorensen
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relying upon allegedly mandatory requirements of the CDC include: Dr. Sorensen claiming per the
CDC the chemical indicators used by Dr. Kerr were not sufficient to insure sterility (Tr. 374, L.2023); that per the CDC the biological indicators Dr. Kerr did not use "are the only process indicators
that directly monitor the lethality of a given sterilization process" (Tr. 371, L.10-15); that the
Hibiclens solution used by Dr. Kerr is not approved by the CDC for cleaning, disinfecting and
sterilizing of reusable medical equipment and was therefore improper (Tr. 369, L.4-13; Tr. 359,
L.11-23); that the CDC requires the use of an enzymatic cleaner in this type of case (Tr. 354; L.1125; Tr. 351, L.14-24); and to comply with the standard of care Dr. Kerr was required to follow the
guidelines of the CDC. Tr. 340, L.18-Tr. 341, L.3. It was error for the court to allow Ballard to
utilize the CDC guidelines to which Appellants objected only to have the court erroneously
pronounce to the jury that compliance with the CDC guidelines was absolutely required.
2.

The district court exceeded its discretion by improperly commenting to
the jury regarding Dr. Kerr's credibility, p. 79.

At a key point in the trial, the defense was responding to Ballard's multiple references made
to Dr. Kerr's deposition and interrogatory answer throughout the trial challenging his credibility
involving the cleaning procedure used. During the defense case in chief the court interfered and
directly questioned Dr. Kerr on key issues:
THE COURT: Sustained. So why did you say you used an enzymatic cleaner when
you hadn't said it before?
THE COURT: The question is, why didn't you read it and change your answers? So
what's your answer?
Tr. 2061, L.23-Tr. 2063, L.19. (Emphasis added).
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The court's comments, including the demeanor of the court which cannot be appreciated
from the transcript, led the jury to conclude that the court itself believed Dr. Kerr had done
something wrong, that he allegedly changed his prior sworn testimony and he was therefore not a
credible witness. This was the jury's determination to make, not the court by directly questioning
Dr. Kerr.
This same issue happened again during the defense efforts at redirect examination of Dr.
Kerr regarding an interrogatory brought up repeatedly by Ballard. Tr. 2279, L.15-Tr. 2280, L.9. Dr.
Kerr was explaining that when he assisted with preparing his answers several years after the care at
issue was rendered that he was no longer the person taking care of cleaning the instruments. This
was to address the enzymatic cleaner issue which Ballard sought to amplify into a significant
"gotcha" issue at the trial. The comi's statements resulted in the complete rejection by the jury of
Dr. Kerr's explanation by effectively instructing them not to consider his explanation and instead
focus only on what was stated in the interrogatory answer. These were improper comments by the
court advocating a position which favored Plaintiff on a disputed issue.
Ballard concludes these were reasonable comments for the court to make, but he does not
distinguish the case authorities relied upon by Appellants, nor offer any in opposition. Ballard takes
the position since there was a dispute regarding Dr. Kerr's trial testimony that it was fair for the
court to comment on it. As set forth in App. Br., the district court exceeded the outer boundaries of
its discretion by engaging in such partisan conduct.
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3.

The district court erred by improperly questioning witnesses and
commenting on the weight of the evidence to the jury, p. 81.

This section of Ballard's Brief is also in response to App. Br. at p. 50-58. He concedes even
if the comi's comments were improper that they should nevertheless be excused as harmless
isolated occurrences not prejudicial to the defense. Res. Br. p. 82-83. Ballard does not respond to
the argument advanced by Appellants that repeated questioning of Dr. Kerr regarding the main
criticism in the complaint was irrelevant and improper for purposes of cross examination. Dr. Kerr
is a physician, not an attorney, and there was no legitimate basis for the court to allow his credibility
to be challenged on cross because he allegedly did not know what Ballard's counsel subjectively
believed to be the main criticism advanced in his complaint.
Ballard questioned Dr. Kerr on cross regarding what was contained within the complaint
which prompted improper commentary by the court to the jury claiming such a line of questioning
was "highly relevant." Tr. 2215, L.16-25; Tr. 2210, L. 24-2211, L. 7. Several additional examples
are cited in App. Br. at p. 53-55. It is not one isolated comment by the court, but rather the
cumulative and repeated occurrences throughout the trial by the comi commenting to the jury on
several disputed issues in the case.
Ballard summarily dismisses the Idaho cases provided on this issue because they are
criminal cases. No authority is provided that the rationale utilized in these cases does not have equal
application in a civil setting. See State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 710-12 (1976); State v. Freitag, 53
Idaho 726 (1933); and State v. Ward, 51 Idaho 68, 77 (1931). Moreover, no effort is made to
distinguish the rationale reached by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Beck, 165 P.3d 1225, 1228Appellants' Reply Brief - 46

29 (Utah 2007) applying its analogous Evidence Rule 614:
"[t]he practice of questioning by a judge is not to be recommended or encouraged
because even with the best of intentions a judge in all sincerity may carry his
examination too far and unwittingly prejudice a defendant before the jury." In
questioning a witness, the judge should not engage in extensive examination or
usurp the function of counsel. The judge must take particular care when the
defendant takes the stand on his or her own behalf, as "any unnecessary comments
by the court are too likely to have a detrimental effect on the jury's ability to decide
the case impartially." These are not new guidelines. They are, and have been, the
clearly established law for a long time. As such, violation of these restrictions is not
only error in nearly every circumstance, but is also obvious, or should have been, to
the trial judge. In this case, the trial judge overstepped these bounds ....
State v. Beck, 165 P.3d at 1228-29 (Emphasis added).
The actions, comments and direct questioning by the district court were unnecessary,
unfairly prosecutorial, and had a detrimental effect on the jury's ability to decide the case
impartially. The frequency and severity of the court's comments do not lend themselves to being
summarily eliminated days later by a general jury instruction that the court did not intend to advance
any opinion regarding credibility or the evidence. No doubt such standard instructions were given
in the above cited cases, however, they were found insufficient as a matter of law to overcome the
substantial prejudice caused by the court's improper comments.
Defendants were unable to locate any authority in Idaho for the proposition that where the
court itself engages in improper conduct the issue is only preserved for appeal if the aggrieved party
makes an after the fact objection to the court's conduct. The defense maintains that to require such
an objection, which prejudice could not have been remedied by the court, would have been fruitless.
As stated in United States v. Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1980), "When a judge
interjects himself into a trial by questioning witnesses, the judge places the opposing counsel in a
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disadvantageous position. The attorney may hesitate to object to the judge's examination for fear of
creating a conflict, or appearing to create a conflict, between the judge and himself." The district
court in this case engaged in partisan conduct which favored Ballard in front of the jury which later
found in his favor. This is plain error by the court is obvious on its face. 16 Per I.R.E. 103(d) it was
not haimless and it unfairly prejudiced substantial rights of the defense.

F.

The district court erred in refusing to uphold the requirements of I.R.C.P.
33(b)(2), p. 84.

Ballard argues the use of the deposition of Dr. Kerr should have been expected so there was
no prejudice and therefore no error. He does not refute the arguments advanced in App. Br. p. 8486, nor address the fact that the interrogatory responses were utilized with numerous witnesses. Id.
Ballard provides no authority to support his position that the application of I.R.C.P. 33(b)(2) is
somehow trumped by seeking to use it as a prior inconsistent statement under I.R.E. 801 (d)(l ).
Conflicts involving evidentiary rules are controlled by I.R.E. 1102 which provides,
"Statutory provisions and rules governing the admissibility of evidence, to the extent they are
evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with applicable Idaho Rules of Evidence, are
ofno force or effect." See also State, Dep't ofH. & W., ex rel. Osborn v. Altman, 122 Idaho 1004,
1006 (1992); State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971,974 (1992). Appellants contend that the prior

16 In civil cases there is no clear adoption of a counterpart to the plain or fundamental error doctrine
beyond IRE 103(d). To demonstrate fundamental error in a criminal case requires the three prong
test set forth in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,228 (2010). In other jurisdictions the plain-error test
that applies in civil cases is essentially the same as for criminal cases. See i.e. Frazier v. Burlington
Northern Santa Fe Corp., 811 N.W.2d 618,626 (Minn.2012).
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notice of intent to use requirement for an interrogatory set forth in I.R.C.P. 33(b)(2) is not
evidentiary in nature and therefore not in conflict with I.R.E. 801 (d)(2).
Instead, this civil rule is simply a prerequisite to such attorney prepared litigation documents
being eligible for use at trial. For this reason, it was error for the court to allow these interrogatory
answers to be used throughout the trial absent the required advance disclosure required by the rule.
To allow otherwise eliminates the very purpose of the rule as it is clearly worded. Allowing the use
of a discovery answer as a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes without ever
having identified in advance of trial is directly contrary to the express language ofl.R.C.P. 33(b )(2).
This was reversible error.
G.

The district court abused its discretion by allowing juror questions, p. 86.

Ballard argues Appellants had to advance specific objections to each juror question on the
record for the issue to be preserved for appeal. He also states Appellants are only appealing ten
juror questions. Res. Br. p. 88. This is not true. Appellants objected both to the individual juror
questions and to the district court process of allowing juror questions. App. Br. p. 74-79. Opposing
this issue, Ballard cites cases for various propositions, but does not provide any analysis of those
cases or demonstrate how they apply to this case. He makes no effort to address the case authorities
advanced regarding proper safeguards for allowing juror questions. Instead, Ballard takes the
simplistic view that Rule 47(u) allows any juror questions and that this should end the analysis.
The defense preserved this issue for appeal by immediately objecting when the court agreed
to allow juror questions. Tr. 76, L.8-18. This preserved the issue for appeal of the court's procedure
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for allowing juror questions. The defense followed up by objecting and creating a written record on
appeal by noting objections on the specific juror questions reaffoming for a second time that the
defense objected to allowing juror questions. See Supp. Rec. Juror Q. 1-36. To the extent discussion
regarding specific juror question objections was had with the court during sidebar conferences,
there is no record available which is precisely part of the problem with the court's procedure which
Appellants challenge on appeal. Regardless of how many objections the defense advanced
regarding relevance, hearsay, foundation, etc. there would still be no record on appeal given the
procedure utilized by the court. For these reasons the juror question issue has been properly
preserved for purposes of this appeal.
Regarding the standard of review for this issue, this "Court disregards errors made on
evidentiary rulings unless the rulings were a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and
affected the party's substantial rights. H.F.L.P., LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 686
(2014) (citing I.R.E. 103(a) and I.R.C.P. 61) (case citations omitted). Appellants could not locate
any Idaho case defining what is considered in determining if a "substantial right" of a party has
been impacted. Conceptually, what qualifies as a "substantial right" will vary depending on the type
of case and nature of the issues before the court. See i.e. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226 (2010)
(defining an error involving a substantial right as one that affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.) In this case, the defense contends the improper jury questioning procedure utilized
by the court did affect the outcome of the trial and negatively impacted substantial rights of
Appellants as set forth in their opening brief at p. 77-86 and as outlined below.
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Allowing juror questions tainted the trial process by promoting premature deliberation,
allowing jurors to express positions through non-fact-clarifying questions, and altering the role of
the jury from neutral fact-finder to inquisitor and advocate. See United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12
14-15 (2d Cir. 1995). Ballard does not address this issue and instead focuses on whether individual
objections were made thereby ignoring the global prejudice issue which the court's jury questioning
procedure and repeated changing of questions allowed. For example, over defense objection the
court asked Dr. Kerr this juror question: "There is some residual fat left in each syringe. How much
time can a syringe be exposed before it would be labeled unsafe? Answer: You know, I don't know
that there is an exact number. You certainly wouldn't want to use one that was out overnight or an
extended period of time ... " Tr. 2288, L.21-2289, L.2. There was no evidence presented at the trial
that fat harvested for the fat transfer had been left out too long or that the procedure took too long
and no expert opinion criticizing the defense for this issue was advanced. This juror question was
in violation of Rule 611 (b ). The question and answer left the jury to infer that Dr. Kerr must not
have enough knowledge to perform the surgery which is one of the arguments Ballard advanced at
the trial. Since this question involved an unrelated issue, it was irrelevant and should not have been
read to the jury.
Another example involved the testimony of the defense infectious disease expert, Dr.
Thomas Coffman. The court did not read several of his juror questions correctly. One juror asked:
"How long would it take bacteria in a cannula to attach to newly extracted fat. Is it possible the
bacteria only attached to some of the fat?" Jury Q. p. 31. The question actually asked by the court
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was completely different. See Tr. 1931, L.24-1932, L.1. Without having a copy of the question
available, there was no way for defense counsel to appreciate how the court had altered the question
to correct the court or follow up on re-direct. Under Rule 47(q) the court did not have the right to
change this question into something entirely different.
Also involving Dr. Coffman the court came up with its own undisclosed question between
juror questions asking: "All gram negative rods are note-Coli?" Tr. 1933, L.18-19. When read in
context, this question was adversarial in nature and not intended to clarify anything stated in the
preceding questions for this witness. If the idea is that the jury is being allowed to ask questions to
clarify issues, why should the court then be allowed to come up with more questions at that time?
The question asked by the court is a question Ballard could have asked on re-cross. The fact it was
asked by the comi gave it unfair meaning and weight to the jury. The court's question was directly
contrary to the defense theory that the gram negative bacteria found in Krystal's right buttock were
e-coli bacteria from her colon. The district court's question was an abuse of discretion which
unfairly challenged the defense theory regarding the origin of gram negative bacteria.
Some of the unread juror questions for Dr. Coffman included: "If it were e-coli [bacteria]
that was present in Ms. Ballard's right buttock, could it have arrived from any other source other
than her bowels?" Jury Q. p. 30. Also: What is the chance of non-sterilized materials getting into
the areas where the fat was harvested when suction is used not injected." Jury Q. p. 31. Instead of
asking these questions, which supported the defense theory, the comi arbitrarily stated: "Okay. All
right. And then some of the -- a couple of the questions seem to go into areas that would be relevant
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to other witnesses who previously testified, and so - and also to some questions that the jury itself
would have to resolve ... " Tr. 1935, L. 17-24. By not reading these questions and without sustaining
any objection or at least clarifying for the parties why the questions were not asked or what would
be asked, the court's actions lead to the conclusion it essentially cherry picked those questions it
wanted to read. This, by its very nature, amounts to a manifest abuse of discretion given the absence
of any explanation by the court for its actions. Why would the court on its own ask Dr. Coffman,
an infectious disease expert, regarding other types of gram negative rods, but then elect not to ask
him where else e-coli could come from other then the patient's bowels?
During the testimony of defense expert Dr. Stiller the court did not read several juror
questions correctly. One juror asked: "In your current medical practice would you prefer to use
reusable medical instruments which have been fully cleansed of all debris versus those which are
sterile yet still contain debris?" Jury Q. p. 25. The question read by the court was appreciably
different. See Tr. 1726, L.4-8. Without a copy of these questions there was no opportunity to follow
along and object. The change eliminated the critical word "sterile" from the question which was the
key issue. The court similarly misread this jury question to Dr. Stiller: "If hundred [sic] of injection
sites were used were all examined in autopsy?" Jury Q. p. 27. The question asked by the court, was
significantly different. See Tr. 1727, L.7-12. The juror question related to what was done during
the autopsy, but the court changed the question entirely shifting the focus to how the fat was injected
by Dr. Kerr. If the actual question had been asked as worded, it would have demonstrated to the
jury that all the surgical sites in the patient were grossly examined at autopsy and only one of the
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sites in the right buttock was determined to have any gram negative bacteria.
The court decided on its own to "summarize" other juror questions to Dr. Stiller. See Tr.
1728, L.23-1729, L.5. The court's question stands in stark contrast to the actual juror questions
found at Jury Q. p. 24-26. None of these questions were read despite the fact no objections to them
were ever sustained pursuant to the court's stated procedure. Another juror asked Dr. Stiller about
the requirements for Idaho law associated with the application of cleaning guidelines and asked:
I asked this question to a previous witness, but Dr. Stiller's testimony suggested that
it was misunderstood and answered incorrectly the first time. Thank you © In July
of 2010 were there requirements per Idaho State Law for cleaning and sterilization
of reusable instruments, or were there only suggested guidelines for this process?
How about currently? Jury Q. p. 26.
The court refused to read this question and wrote on it that the issue would be addressed in
jury instructions. Id. The court told the jury at that time that: "Okay. As to the standards of Idaho
law, I will give the jury the standards in jury -- I will address that in jury instructions ... " Tr. 1729,
L.9-12. Nothing related to this issue was included in the jury instructions despite what the court
said it would do. R. 2481-2509. Viewing the distinctive handwriting of this juror question, the prior
witness this juror referred to questioning was plaintiffs expert, Dr. Sorenson. See Jury Q. p. 3. The
juror question answered by Ballard's expert was: "THE COURT: Okay. The sterilization guidelines
were mentioned. Are these required standards for -- are there required standards for sterilization as
well? THE WITNESS: Yes." Tr. 513, L.4-8.
Reading the two questions posed by this juror to Drs. Sorensen and Stiller, Ballard expert
was allowed to answer questions about sterilization guidelines claiming they were required in order
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to comply with the applicable standard of practice, whereas the defense experts who disputed this
claim was not allowed to answer the same question posed by the same juror who was obviously
confused over this issue. The court instead told them the issue would be covered in the jury
instructions which did not happen. The cumulative effect of the improper juror questions
demonstrates both the trial court's manifest abuse of discretion in deciding how to utilize juror
questions and that these errors effected substantial right of the defense. H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho
at 686. Had the court not allowed juror questions, or limited them as the cited case authority
suggests should have been done, the outcome of this case would have been different.
H.

The repeated examples of the district court exceeding the outer boundaries of
its discretion establish the presence of cumulative error, p. 89.

Ballard contends the cumulative error doctrine only applies in criminal cases. A review of
Idaho authorities discussing this doctrine, including those he cited, does not reflect any such
limitation. The cumulative error doctrine "refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which
by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial ... "
State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 822 (Ct.App.1992). The concept is that while one error taken alone
may be harmless, when the errors are viewed collectively this supports a reversal. Appellants
contend the numerous errors identified herein were not harmless. Thus, the only basis for applying
the cumulative error doctrine would be if it is needed as an alternative ground for reversing the
court. Ballard states that the only errors for which the cumulative error doctrine should apply are
limited to those in that section of App. Br. This is not true and the brief specifically states "in
addition to the above examples." App. Br. p. 62. The cumulative effect of all of these errors provides
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separate and independent grounds upon which the defense is entitled to a new trial.
I.

Ballard is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code
§12-121.

There is no basis for entering any award against Appellants. Idaho law on this issue is clear:
"Where an appeal presents a genuine issue of law, fact or discretion for review, we will not award
attorney fees on appeal." Spencer v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 106 Idaho 316 (Ct.App.1984). See also,
Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 93 (1991); Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125
Idaho 237, 251 (1993). There are several unique issues in this appeal including matters of first
impression. Under I.C. 12-121 this court has discretion regarding costs and attorney fees. The
briefing in this case demonstrates this appeal was not brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation. Given the nature and extent of issues raised, Appellants contend there is no
basis to award costs and attorney fees should the court find against Appellants.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Appellants have properly preserved these issues for appeal
and request the Court reverse the jury verdict and grant the relief requested in their opening brief.
DATED this

gth

day of December, 2015.
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